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This research assesses the success of collaboration agreements through changes in
competitive strength rather than the longevity of the transactions or the formality and visible
structure of the agreements. To establish competitive strength, as development and renewal
of capabilities, the research proceeds through a review of the alliance between the Co-
operative Permanent Building Society, the Co-operative Wholesale Society, Scottish Co-
operative Wholesale Society and Co-operative Insurance Society (1943-65). This co-
operative agreement gives insights into the strategy of non-banks and non-finance
participants aiming to enter British bank markets. The research also considers the rather
different process at Spanish savings banks with a particular focus on information technology
outsourcing (1977-95). Cases in the UK and Spain form an historical argument and are
used to demonstrate how the implementation of strategy is as important as strategic visioning
to achieve competitive advantage in bank markets.
Keywords: Banks, Corporate Strategy, Networks.3
I
In the literature, regulation has been viewed as mitigating competition as well as
hindering the adoption of technological innovation
1. Regulatory innovations that developed
into barriers to entry into markets for financial services in general and commercial banking in
particular, can be traced back to bank charters in the late 18
th century. However, it was not
until 1960 when concerns were raised regarding the design of an optimal banking structure
that, responding to a ruling of the Supreme Court, US government agencies had to consider
the anti-trust effects of mergers in banking
2. More recently, after a period of intense
regulatory change during the 1970s and 1980s, the potential for fraud, money laundering
and systemic failure imposed  supervision, regulation and minimum capital requirement as
prerequisites on those willing or able to participate in bank markets
3.
In spite of considerable interest in the analysis of methods to ascertain an optimal
structure for banking, Alton Gilbert’s
4 landmark compilation warned that an assessment of
the effects regulatory change has had in determining bank performance was conspicuously
absent from the analysis of structure-conduct-performance in banking. It was not until
recently that an important number of contributions thoroughly debated the economic role of
market competition, its benefits and its workings in financial mediation
5. This article
contributes to research into the effects of regulation on performance in bank markets by
looking into how and why collaboration between non-bank financial competitors emerges in
the context of changed competition (as reflected by distinct competitive environments in
Spain and the UK).
External change (such as regulatory innovations and technological progress) can modify
competition in bank markets. There are several potential strategic responses of actual and
potential participants in banking to external innovations and competitive collaboration is one
of them. However, competitive collaboration, as undertaken by participants in banking
during the second half of the 20
th century, seems to be an under-researched organisational
form
6. Moreover, practitioner and academic research on inter-firm co-operation has
predominately focused attention on cross-border growth of banking institutions while
excluding the assessment of collaboration amongst banks, non-bank and non-financial
intermediaries with the potential of contesting domestic bank markets
7.4
Some contributions to management literature suggest there is a wide spectrum of
organisational forms adopted by collaborators
8. What is distinctive about the incentives to
engage in competitive collaboration explored in this study, is the focus on the relative
success of implementing strategic vision through co-operation.  The evolution of two
integration episodes in retail banking helps to assess the success of collaboration agreements
through the development and renewal of capabilities as measured by changes in competitive
strength rather than the longevity of the transactions or the formality and visible structure of
agreements
9. For instance, through collaboration strategies and outsourcing, alliance
members can achieve capabilities that as a group allow them to challenge banks in the
provision of retail finance
10. As independent companies the absolute investment and
information barriers would have made risks of entry far more of a deterrent.
The discussion, therefore, reviews bank capabilities in terms of their advantage relative
to complex (alliance) competition as well as relative to direct competition. Risk management
skills and participants’ willingness to develop sunk (administrative) capabilities emerge as
two of the key areas mitigating competitiveness. As a result, the stance taken throughout the
research to evaluate collaboration sees competitive co-operation as an essentially tactical
element.
Results for this research into the formation and evolution of inter-firm collaboration in
banking, suggest that collaboration allowed participants in Spanish and UK banking to
internalise competencies and learn from their associates, while co-operation was aimed at
overcoming regulatory and environmental restrictions to market penetration. Research
results thus advance the literature on organisational alliances and collaboration in general, by
suggesting a link between strategic visioning and forces instigating collaboration amongst
actual and potential participants in bank markets.
The research also suggests a link between collaboration agreements and the relative
success of implementing related and semi-related diversification in bank markets.
Collaboration is of interest to managers working in competitive but otherwise geographically
segmented markets, such as the UK retail financial services market in the post war period,
as a cost-effective alternative to implementing geographic diversification prior to per capita
income rising. In particular, this contribution depicts the evolution of an early attempt at a
collaboration agreement in UK retail finance. The review of collaboration has, on the one5
hand,  the Co-operative Permanent Building Society (CPBS). On the other hand, the Co-
operative Insurance Society (CIS) and both the Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society
and the Co-operative Wholesale Society (CWS). This alliance allows insights into the
strategy of a non-bank and a non-financial participant aiming to enter bank markets. This
alliance illustrates how mutual financial intermediaries found a promising growth opportunity
in the relatively stable UK bank markets of the post war recovery years, markets that were
characterised by little regulatory change or technological innovation. However, the
opportunity discovered by CPBS and CWS managers was lost because of poor execution.
In what follows, the research explores competitive collaboration by taking the view that
the only (relevant) costs to enter a market are those known to be sunk and which become
exit barriers
11. From the ‘contestable market’ perspective the degree of competition
diminishes through means other than those facilitating collusion or reducing the number of
independent participants. Competitive pressures are lower to the extent that known sunk
costs reduce the threat of out-of-market participants entering the market. Strategic
orientation is important for anticipating competitive advantage, including withstanding
environmental turbulence unexpectedly turning idiosyncratic investments into exit barriers.
This second theme is explored through the establishment and performance of the
Confederation of Spanish Savings Banks (CECA), which was established in 1927. CECA
comprised a group of financial intermediaries that for over 50 years had had their business
potential and diversification opportunities (in bank markets) limited by regulation. However,
economic growth in Spain during the 1980s, domestic regulatory change and the adoption of
information and telecommunication technologies (IT) permitted these mutual financial
intermediaries to successfully diversify in Spanish bank markets. The analysis considers how
some growth opportunities were siezed by managers of  CECA and how some others were
created by managers of Spanish savings banks. These actions resulted in a high sustainability
of competitive advantage for the whole alliance.
The article proceeds, first, by interweaving analytical categories with contextual events in
the UK and Spain. Hence, section two identifies the roots of mutual financial organisations in
the UK and Spain. Section three summarises the structure of mutual financial services in
Spain and section four that of the UK. The article then considers associations that emerged
out of strategies of competitive collaboration. Section five describes the establishment of the6
CPBS-CWS Alliance (1943-65), while section six assesses that co-operative agreement, in
light of the strategic intent of non-bank and non-finance participants aiming to enter British
bank markets. In section seven the article considers the rather different process at Spanish
savings banks, while section eight focuses on IT outsourcing (1977-95). Section nine is the
final section and discusses the evolution potential of outsourcing in financial services, its
impact on integration and collaboration, and whether alliances by banks were successful in
deterring threats from non-bank and non-finance intermediaries. The analysis also considers
why an alliance solution provides a successful response to changes in regulation and
economic environment for only one of the collaboration agreements.
II
Given the lack of widely-accepted definitions of co-operative activity, the discussion of
inter-firm co-operation risks floundering because of the failure to specify the exact form of
collaboration
12. Inter-firm relations take many forms and serve many purposes. Hence, it is
useful to identify which part of the value chain is the focus of the agreement. Also, it is worth
establishing whether there is (tacit or implicit) co-operation for direct involvement as
measured by equity in joint ventures or the appointment of liaison managers
13.
Firms engage in competitive collaboration through strategic alliances, outsourcing
agreements, product licensing, co-operative research and an extended range of ‘rights’
(including rights to sell or buy). Such strategies allow partners in the transaction to achieve
critical scale in a competency, distribution capability or markets currently out of their
reach
14. According to this view, the main value of competitive collaboration for individual
organisations is co-operation turning into a form of inter-partner learning
15. There is an
evolutionary context to this view because learning implies adaptation and change, and indeed
an important analytical stream has focused on the evolution of collaboration. In other words,
the evolution of inter-firm co-operation is viewed in the broad sense of the life cycle of a
product or service, that is, as a notion of transformation over time and adaptation to
contextual and environmental contingencies.
This article reports on research into competitive collaboration between banks and non-
banks as well as between banks, non-banks and non-financial organisations aiming to
contest bank markets. It was conducted through an historical evaluation of associations in7
two different competitive environments and provides an international comparison. An
historical analysis of collaboration enabled the assessment of organisational transformation
from the inception of collaborators in the market to the eventual success or failure of the
agreement. The financial service organisations, which are the topic of this article, were
originally established as independent providers but all were guided by a common principle.
This unifying concept dates to 1810 when the first ‘savings’ bank was established in
Ruthwell, Scotland
16.
From the outset savings banks were retail finance institutions organised as mutuals:
owned by depositors and generally operated through democratic guidelines. Savings banks
sought to create thrifty habits amongst small and medium-sized savers like craftsmen, house
servants or the growing proletariat, that is, outside the banks' target market
17. In the first half
of the 19
th century, bank-runs or bank collapses were common, so mutual savings banks
had no safe outlet for deposits. To create trust among potential depositors and as a matter
of policy, funds from 1817 onwards were invested in government bonds or deposited at the
Bank of England
18.
Savings banks paying interest on deposits (at a rate ranging from three to five per cent
per annum) proliferated. The number of successful institutions in the UK grew until it
reached 645 in 1861
19. Market diversification started as some of these banks made
advances to local authorities, but the Savings Bank Act of 1891 expressly prohibited this
practice. It was not until the mid-1960s that savings banks were allowed to issue current
accounts, undertake the payment of utility bills, and safeguard securities and valuables,
because throughout most of the 19
th and 20
th centuries deposits at savings banks were used
to finance government debt
20.
In 1872 The Co-operative Wholesale Society (CWS) formed a Loan and Deposit
Department. This marked another stage in the growth of a democratically-based social
movement that sought to counteract the market power of conventionally financed
organisations. This philosophy was summarised as ‘...early co-operators were insistent that
capital should become an “employee” of the Movement, not a master’
21.
That aim restricted the type of financial operations in which the CWS could engage and
therefore limited the growth in the business portfolio of CWS's financial subsidiaries while
bounding their geographic diversification to the British Isles. Legal restrictions also existed8
but in 1876 an amendment to the Industrial and Provident Societies Act revoked the ban on
registered co-operatives owning banks. The CWS Loan and Deposit Department was
registered as a subsidiary and renamed the CWS Bank. The purpose of the bank was to
finance both wholesale activities and capital requirements for the CWS and its retail
members. Unlike the pattern in Continental Europe, the CWS Bank remained the only co-
operative full service financial institution in the UK, with building societies operating as
mutuals and dealing primarily in financing home acquisitions.
Other European countries adopted the Scottish model early on.  This type of savings
bank was popular in countries with traditional Protestant values of self-help, where the ideas
of Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and Thomas R. Malthus (1776-1834) were particularly
influential
22. Such was not the case in Portugal and Spain where savings banks started rather
late (1836 and 1839, respectively) and  followed the French model (established in 1818).
Unlike the Scottish savings banks, French-style savings banks created an initial fund to
cover set-up costs and unexpected losses through donations and setting up a charity. After
this the banks became autonomous with a governing board of six to 20 principals (working
pro bono) holding responsibility for the strategic direction and overall affairs of the banks
23.
Both in Portugal and Spain the most common source of the set-up fund was the local
‘Mount of Piety’.
‘Mount of Piety’ is a literal translation from ‘Monte de Piedad’ or ‘Pío Monte’ because
no colloquial term was found to describe this Franciscan charity institution
24. Formed in the
15
th century in Italy, their aim was to eradicate usury through low- or non-interest paying
loans. Advances were made against some kind of collateral in pawn (typically, jewellery or
real estate). Initial capital was raised through charitable donantions and then, following its
original Thomist Philosophy, the Mounts would only finance short-term needs. The ‘Mount
of Piety’ is a different organisational form from the so-called ‘Montepío’, which appeared
during the second half of the 18
th century
25. The ‘Montepío’ was a mutual, agnostic, and
government controlled institution established by craftsmen or lesser standing professionals to
care for members' needs when disabled or rehabilitating. They operated under a Patron
Saint and in a church or monastery but without any religious obligation (and many had an
ephemeral life).9
Like their counterparts in Scotland and France, Spanish savings banks initially placed
excess deposits at a government owned institution (Caja General de Consignaciones, 1835-
68). This portfolio strategy, however, was short lived due to the poor quality of government
bonds in the 18
th and 19
th centuries. Instead, Spanish savings banks (‘cajas de ahorro’ or
‘cajas’) increasingly used deposits exclusively to finance the activities of the ‘Mount of
Piety’.
In short, since the 19
th century mutual financial organisations have been participants in
UK and Spanish bank markets. There was little opportunity or indeed incentives for
collaboration during the initial stages of development of these intermediaries. However,
throughout the 20
th century a potentially wide spectrum of organisational forms could be
adopted between mutual financial organisations with in- and out-of market participants and
competitive collaboration was one of these organisational forms. In what follows the
research assesses the likelihood that actual or potential participants in bank markets engage
in any or all of these potential organisational forms of competitive collaboration. The
discussion develops the notion that the strategic success of collaboration is based on the
transformation over time of established participants in bank markets and their adaptation to
contextual and environmental contingencies.
III
Understanding the interaction between formation and longevity of collaboration is
particularly important because evolutionary processes are sensitive to the initial conditions in
which collaboration emerges and takes on its organisational form. Yves L. Doz has looked
at the evolutionary rationale in depth and explored the effect of initial conditions on the
learning processes (rather than on the outcomes)
26. In particular he addressed the
importance of the initial conditions in creating progressive patterns of learning as well as
adaptation.
In this article, evidence from building societies and non-bank intermediaries in the UK
shows how collaboration offered the potential for each to supply services previously out of
their scope in the context of sequences of interactive cycles of learning, valuation and
adjustment. The historical UK example gives insights into how mutual financial intermediaries
found a promising growth opportunity in relatively stable bank markets; markets that were10
characterised by little regulatory change or technological innovation. However, the
opportunity identified by CPBS and CWS managers was lost because of poor execution.
Research in this article thus supports the idea that patterns of learning are rooted in how
cognitive-individual learning evolves into behavioural-organisational learning. Initial
conditions may foster or block both types of learning and how learning processes are
reviewed themselves (learning to learn) by individuals and the organisation itself.
At the same time, evidence from Spanish banking illustrates how competitive
collaboration transformed shared experiences, allowed the implementation of opportunistic
strategies and in turn, the creation of critical mass to effectively contest bank markets. The
relative success of  the ‘cajas’ (i.e. savings banks) entering Spanish bank markets is
summarised in Table 1, which depicts the growth in the number and relative importance of
savings banks in Spain. Most early-established cajas were found in the biggest urban
centres, and grew in financial strength through retained surpluses. By the turn of the century
most assets were held in the savings banks located in seaports and industrial cities. At the
same time and responding to widespread bankruptcies in 1853 and 1869, the activities of
the cajas in financial markets were limited because the Spanish government introduced
legislation restricting savings banks’ activities
27.
Increasing financial strength was particularly evident from 1851 to 1895. During this
period the pawn or emergency loan operations of the Mounts of Piety no longer absorbed
all deposits from the savings bank. As a result the cajas began making short-term advances
and issuing mortgages directly to the public
28.
After the turn of the century the number of Spanish savings banks tripled although no
major change in regulation policy or the banks' business portfolio occurred. Most of these
new cajas were established in the countryside under the auspices of the syndicalist and co-
operativist movements
29. After the first world war, the Spanish government enacted tighter
bank regulation and also created a banking cartel (more below). Legislation in 1926, 1929
and 1933 brought an end to the cajas' charitable nature and turned their profits into the main
source of funds to finance the provision of social welfare and agricultural projects
30.
















1839 1 N/A N/A N/A
1874 53 N/A 17 N/A
1890 53 N/A 98 N/A
1901 59 N/A 146 N/A
1920 178  N/A 687 N/A
1927 151 74 1,440 N/A
1940 166 98 3,384 N/A
1950 78 78 13,979 N/A
1960 82 82 74,266 24.5%
1965 86 86 205,039 26.2%
1970 87 87 538,850 31.2%
1975 88 88 1,514,585 31.3%
1980 79 79 3,743,693 31.6%
1985 77 77 9,127,809 34.0%
1990 57 57 19,791,800 38.6%
1995 50 50 31,074,000 42.3%
* Spanish Confederation of Savings Banks or Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorro
Sources: F. Ros Pérez, Las cajas de ahorros en España: Evolución y regimen jurídico (Murcia, 1996), pp.
122-3 and 138-9; J. J. Toribio Dávila, ‘Tradición y modernidad en las cajas de ahorro’, Papeles de
Economía Española, Vol. 46 (1991), p. 23; Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorro Las Cajas de
Ahorro en el Entorno Actual, 72th General Assembly (Madrid, 1996), p. 50; author.
Between 1921 and 1939, most savings banks remained local institutions but the biggest
cajas started to expand within their province and across adjacent areas
31. In the course of
the first quarter of the century competition increased for the cajas from two sources
32. First,
government-owned banks were established. Secondly, private banks developed national
branch networks by capitalising on greater balance-sheet strength.
By the beginning of the Spanish Civil War (1936-9), private banks dominated financial
markets. They were organised by their underlying group (called Consejo Superior Bancario)
and supervised by the Bank of Spain and ultimately, by the Finance Ministry.
The Franco regime (1939-75), reaffirmed the pre-eminence of private banks within the
Spanish financial system and, as illustrated in Table 2, introduced regulation that
handicapped traditional savings banks. Table 2 considers how supervision of the cajas
transferred from the Ministry of the Interior to the Bank of Spain. Table 2 also summarises
other forces mitigating direct competition in savings bank markets as well as Spanish savings
banks entering other financial markets. The summary in Table 2 gives equal weighting to all
barriers to entry and suggests two periods of intense regulatory change for the cajas. The
first was the years after the Civil War and prior to the Economic Stabilisation Plan
(particularly 1951-7). The second period of intense regulatory change is somewhat longer12
and seems to be located around the transition to democracy and Spain’s accession to the
European Union (particularly 1974-87).
Table 2: Regulatory Constrains on the Activities of the ‘Cajas’, 1921-97
Supervision of Savings Banks
Home Office (1921-6) Finance Ministry (1935-71)
Ministry of Commerce (1927-56) Bank of Spain (1971-97)
Regulation Limiting Competition and Diversification
Fixed percentage of deposits invested to be in
government debt (1926-92)
Finance Ministry fixes interest rates and
commission charges (1943-89)
Special registry to acquire charter as financial
institution (1929-97)
Ban on cross-regional retail branch growth
(1946-64 and 1974-87)
Provision for minimum expenditure of social
charter (1933-79).
Total ban on new savings banks (1946-64 and
1975-94)
Provision for minimum accrual of capital and
reserves (1933-85).
Government encourages mergers of
commercial banks and regional amalgamation
of savings banks (1975-87)
Ban on FX  and international trade
transactions (1933-77)
Loans and own-social-charter expenditure
limited to regional scope (1977-87)
Government control of diversification in loan
portfolio (1933-89)
Freedom to set interest rates for assets and
liabilities with less than 1 year maturity (1977)
Government stimulates growth of the savings
banks’ retail branch network (1939-63)
Freedom to set interest rate levels on liabilities
with more than 6 month maturity and total
freedom to set interest rates on assets (1982)
Ban on cross regional amalgamation of
savings banks (1939-88)
Second Banking Directive comes into effect in
Spain (1994)
Economic and Political Milestones
Cartel of commercial banks (1921-38 and 1946-
94)
Banking mini-reform (1974)
Private banks begin retail bank branch
expansion to achieve national exposure (1923)
Fuentes Quintana reform (1977)
Economic Stabilisation Plan (1959) Spain joins the European Community (1985)
Sources: F. Ros Pérez, Las cajas de ahorros en España: Evolución y regimen jurídico (Murcia, 1996), pp.
122-3 and 138-9; Biblioteca del Banco de España; author.
The context of the first of the episodes of regulatory change for the cajas was
characterised by the intensification of regulatory burdens and marked by the overwhelming
majority of new cajas, that were established between 1939 and 1977, being set-up by local13
and central governments
33. The Franco regime continued implementing a practice developed
during the 1920s called the ‘principle of territoriality’, meaning that the business of the
savings banks was restricted to their province. This principle remained an informal
arrangement until it was enacted into law in 1964. At the same time, the increasing asset
base of the cajas prompted the Finance Ministry to start regulating the sources and
applications of their funds. As a result, the Finance Ministry directed a growing proportion
of the assets of cajas to finance public debentures and private banks' short term liabilities
34,
with the added result that the policy significantly reduced funds available for agricultural
projects and other traditional lending activities
35.
The context of the second regulatory change for the cajas dates to the last stage of the
Franco regime, when attempts were made to ease the regulatory burden on Spanish savings
banks (particularly in 1962 and 1964). Nonetheless, until 1974 the cajas remained outside
the Spanish clearing house system and had access to only a restricted business portfolio.
However, under the ‘Fuentes Quintana Reform’ (1977), the competitive environments for
savings and private banks started to converge. The reform gave savings banks strong
incentives to modernise their infrastructure and develop new skills
36. In 1977, for example,
the Bank of Spain authorised the first ATMs for the cajas
37 and by 1996, their combined
network had 14,169 machines or in a wider context, was the biggest network in Spain and
the third largest in the world
38.
The case of the Spanish savings banks thus suggested that collaboration in markets with
a handful of participants can enable those with fewer resources and capabilities to absorb
market intelligence without disrupting competitive equilibria. Furthermore, this study offers
details on how a Spanish ‘central’ savings bank was instrumental for savings banks
contesting markets traditionally dominated by commercial banks.
Research results thus support the idea that competitive collaboration can enable the
creation of inter-organisational processes and procedures to distribute otherwise
inaccessible information. The development and transformation of competitive capabilities of
one or all of the partners, therefore, should be seen as the appropriate indicator for
successful collaboration
39.  However, the intensity of competition could remain unchanged
unless opportunities opened by collaboration are implemented successfully. This theme is
further explored in this study by the failure of the CWS and Scottish CWS to transform the14
capabilities of its subsidiaries in UK retail finance, link with the CPBS and, as a result,
become the first ‘one stop’ financial conglomerate in the world.
In summary, the evolving nature of competitive collaboration and any form of inter-
organisational dynamics is the motivation for analysing cases with an historical perspective.
An historical view of an economic problem requires interweaving conceptual structures with
contextual events and identifying how and why transitions appear. In this sense the research
that follows aims to bring the history back to the concepts using as evidence comparative
historical cases in Spain and the UK. Rather than providing an explanatory hypothesis to a
problem, it aims to show how and why those business practices emerged in their respective
contexts and explain their outcome in the light of conceptual tools.
IV
There are alternative ways to explore the formation and evolution of competitive
collaboration. For instance, one approach involves assessing whether participants have clear
goals and shared expectations
40. Fuzzy objectives prevent designing adequate risk/reward
agreements while asymmetric expectations of the various participants result in varying levels
of commitment, that is a participant’s willingness to develop idiosyncratic resources. Other
views are interested in the extent to which collaboration will complement pre-collaboration
activities, operate to the disadvantage of other collaboration agreements and limit the
agreement to original signatories
41. Yet other views aim to assess whether co-operation is a
pro-active (i.e. offensive) or reactive (i.e. defensive) response to uncertainty and
environmental turbulence
42.
Alongside these alternative ways of exploring the formation and evolution of competitive
collaboration, an overarching framework to assess inter-firm co-operation can develop
under two complementary approaches
43. First is a transactional view based on the degree of
integration of firms, a continuous scale from market interaction to full vertical integration that
places collaboration as a form of arms-length integration. A second approach is based on
commitment, which emphasises the degree of mutual interdependence between the parties
involved in an alliance. These views together allow a structured definition of the formation of
competitive collaboration agreements and the organisational form they are likely to adopt, as15
well as offering a consistent reference point from which to study the evolution and longevity
of collaboration agreements.
Equally important to the degree of integration and commitment in ‘dyadic relationships’
(i.e. that which is unique to two organisations), is identifying the identity of individuals as well
as the pattern of ties and social connections around co-operation agreements
44. The use of
collaboration to overcome uncertainty seems more likely to take place in relationships in
which organisations (or individuals) are already embedded. This as opposed to an atomistic
notion depicting collaboration as emerging from random events between totally unrelated
organisations.
Hence, a chronicle of the evolution of other mutual financial institutions in the UK and
which were linked to the Co-operative Movement should also consider four other
institutions that emerged alongside the CWS Bank. Together these organisations fashion the
portfolio of business in financial markets under the auspices of the UK’s Co-operative
Movement. In 1876, the first other financial organisation in the UK’s Co-operative
Movement was established in Newcastle-upon-Tyne. The purpose of the Industrial Bank
was supporting an engine factory adjacent to the Tyne but both the bank and the factory
failed shortly after
45.
The second institution was the Southern Co-operative Permanent Building Society
(CPBS), which was founded in February 1884. The ‘Southern’ prefix was removed ten
years afterwards. The purpose of this London-based society was to enhance the working
and living conditions of members. More importantly, the aim was to enable co-operators
who wished to form a society to buy their own premises
46. The CPBS required deposits to
make advances and small loans to members of retail societies but the Co-operative
Congress refused to give full backing to another financial institution developing alongside the
CWS Bank. Nevertheless, many leading and rank and file members of the Co-operative
Movement joined and some even decided to become agents of the CPBS (either personally
or through their retail societies). The CWS Bank fought hard to retain its position as the first
choice for co-operative societies seeking funds. So the CPBS sought business elsewhere,
notably amongst the railway employees
47. The CPBS effectively acted as a mutual building
society, alongside the Co-operative Movement, but without formally belonging to it.16
A third financial institution developed by the Co-operative Movement was an insurance
arm. Insurance activities dated to 1867, each focusing on specific types of risk such as
health or lost-at-sea cargo. In 1898, the Co-operative Congress extended internal rules so
the CWS could undertake all insurance, except life assurance
48. In October 1913 the Co-
operative Insurance Society (CIS) was formed to operate as a jointly-owned department of
the CWS and the Scottish CWS.  Life assurance started in 1904 and by 1927 together with
fire, motor and general insurance, life assurance represented the biggest sources of premium
income
49.
By the turn of the century, assets at the CWS Bank and CIS had grown with the Co-
operative Movement and both institutions had developed considerable numbers of agents
amongst co-operative retailers. The bank did not enjoy clearing status and found day to day
transactions cumbersome. Because of this, and in spite of the CWS Bank having developed
personal business in savings accounts, personal business was not generally emphasised
50.
Meanwhile, the business portfolio grew outside treasury operations for the CWS and retail
co-operative societies. In 1912 the Northumberland Miners' Association was the first union
to join the bank. After the second world war, the corporate portfolio received significant
business from local governments (benefiting from links with the Labour Party). This
encouraged the bank to extend its services by opening branches in Newcastle and
London
51.
Around this time a second banking department developed within the Co-operative
Movement.  In December 1946, three years after managers of the Scottish CWS had taken
over a small bank in Edinburgh called the People’s Bank
52, the Scottish CWS entered the
banking business. Managers of the Scottish CWS were responding to criticisms that they
had failed to develop a banking arm but also to make the most of term deposits from retail
societies, which had grown from just under ten million in 1936 to £18.4m in 1945. As with
its English counterpart, the Scottish bank did not enjoy clearing status but this time the Co-
operative Movement and managers of the CWS “offered no objection” to another financial
institution developing alongside the CWS Bank
53. During the post-war period and until its
demise in 1973, the SCWS Bank stayed away from personal business and primarily
invested in government securities.17
Meanwhile, the business portfolio of CPBS (as that of most building societies) was
limited to financing mortgages to build personal and industrial dwellings
54. The CPBS
developed a well established personal business supplied from its London office, while its
agency network grew throughout the North of England. By developing personal business the
CPBS avoided being involved in the misfortunes of those building societies that were closely
associated with financing industrial properties.
At the same time, the CPBS, which up to 1920 had generally conducted business from
a single branch in the bottom floor of the head office building, matched the branch expansion
process of many other building societies
 55. The adoption of telephone communications
allowed institutions to manage their treasury and multi-branch operations, as they were
excluded from money transmission transactions by lack of access to the clearing process.
National branch networks for building societies were created more slowly and more
organically than for banks, whose networks were created by the amalgamation process that
swept British financial intermediation at the end of the 19
th century. Indeed, the first building
society to develop a network of branches was the Halifax in 1937, followed by Abbey
National and the Woolwich in 1948 while CPBS came fourth in 1952
56.
Building societies then had to establish correspondent agreements with clearing banks
since the chief method of transferring money within Britain came to consist of the transfer of
bank deposits through written instructions on debtor banks. In other words, cheques
predominated over the use of coins, bank notes or bills of exchange
57.
Despite the growth of branches, the CPBS's financial management left much to be
desired and it often required emergency loans from the CWS Bank
58. By the end of the
1920s these problems were brought under control and growth renewed as branches were
used as ‘small’ savings banks. Branches attracted personal savings accounts and these
provided funding for the much needed short-term liquid resources
59. In 1929, CPBS
became the eighth largest building society in Britain, with nine and half million sterling in total
assets
60. Asset growth continued as rent controls on private dwellings restricted the supply
of rental properties and, thus, encouraged owner occupancies. During the 1930s, the
Society had 12 branches in England and Scotland as well as an extensive agency network in
the retail co-operative movement
61.18
In 1939, the CPBS merged with the Wellingborough Investment Building Society and
the merger increased the branch network to 35 offices
62. In subsequent years the CPBS
continued its expansion by amalgamation but was able to acquire only 11 small-sized
societies
63. As a result of acquisitions and organic geographic expansion, the CPBS
increased its scale and reduced the volatility of its business portfolio and both abilities  to
compete promised to deliver bigger and more stable returns.
Because the CWS had built up strong capital reserves in the recovery years that
followed the Great Depression, the CWS had a number of growth options. To some
people, growth in the business portfolio suggested the CWS could emerge as the ‘first
conglomerate’
64. That is, a firm controlling diverse businesses that were horizontally and
vertically integrated such as finance and tea production or coffee grinding and its retail
distribution through co-operative societies. The CWS's options for growth emerged as
improved trading results and growing membership placed the Co-operative Movement and
the CWS as the biggest retailing group in Britain with extensive holdings in the production
and processing of the goods they sold
65. From 1941 and with increasing frequency from
1943, the CWS began to use excess capital to diversify and a major area of investment was
housing development finance
66.
In summary, evidence offered in this article illustrates how, through collaboration, firms
expect to avoid unnecessary investments, enhance the allocation of scarce financial
resources, gain time to improve their productive efficiency and quality control, and acquire
their partners’ skills and market characteristics. Indeed, empirical-inductive evidence
67
suggests that co-operation and alliances are a transitional step for further interaction between
otherwise independent organisations, that could lead to integrated forms of management and
certainly to the internalisation of partner skills.
Collaboration agreements are unlikely to emerge from random allocation of resources.
Ongoing relationships between firms and amongst individuals, that is social networks, are
likely to influence the choice of partners, the nature and purpose of the agreement, as well as
the contents of information flowing through that agreement. This would suggest that the
social structure in which firms are embedded can limit organisational perceptions of the likely
opportunistic behaviour by partners and, as a result, organisations may be willing to engage
in non-recoverable investments, which can enhance the performance of the agreement
68 and19
change competitive intensity. The research thus illustrates exchanges and discussions within
groups of organisations and individuals who have a history, and whose history results in
establishing routines and stable links amongst members.
Collaboration strategies can reduce entry barriers and improve market competition but
to date disagreement prevails as to whether collaboration strategies deliver sustainable
competitive advantage. Some are sceptical that networks of independent organisations can
articulate long-term management of interdependence
69. Others argue that collaboration
strategies reflect changes in competitive tactics because they can effectively increase market
competition through increased entry threats
70. Throughout these perspectives, however,
possibilities that environmental turbulence creates sunk (i.e. irrecoverable) organisational
costs and deters entry have often been ignored. Barriers to exit may develop ex-post as
firms enter into particular agreements
71. For instance, the possibility of environmental
turbulence in the UK developing into sunk organisational costs, helps to explain why the Co-
operative Wholesale Society (CWS) failed to commit to a collaboration agreement with a
building society and thus, CWS abandoned opportunities to diversify in UK retail bank
markets. At the same time, the strength of the Spanish savings banks through CECA
deterred the entry to their traditional markets of commercial banks until the late 1980s.
Spanish cajas were thus willing to invest in developing CECA partly because of regulatory
constrains but also partly because  of competitive reasons.
Cases in this article, namely CWS’s potential diversification and Spanish savings banks
successfully contesting commercial bank markets, highlight how seldom the discussion
around competitive collaboration considers whether co-operation responds to opportunistic
diversification strategies that pursue income growth rather than enhancement of core
capabilities. Documented evidence in this study thus offers cases of strategic visioning but
failed implementation in the UK. Whereas cases in Spanish banking document opportunistic
but otherwise successful collaboration, which moved forward on flexible organisational
structures (escaping the budgetary rigour associated with the pursuit of strategic intent).
V
During the second world war, the number of building societies fell from 960 to 890 and
the CPBS was at the forefront of merger activity
72. During the war, property values20
increased since half a million homes were destroyed or made unfit, while the number of
families had actually grown
73. As early as 1941 directors of the CPBS were concerned
about how best to participate in the reconstruction effort in a practical way and agreed to
explore the issue further. Initially CPBS directors approached peers throughout the building
society movement but in 1942 the Board decided to strengthen relations with the Co-
operative Movement. In 1943 formal communications entailed with the CWS and the
Scottish CWS, for them and the CPBS to enter discussions in response to expected
changes in property values and aiming to
74:
•  Develop business in the housing market for private occupancy (including plans in which
house purchase could consider hire purchase of movable furniture);
•  Encourage more housing societies within the co-operative movement; and
•  Provide a range of loan producing insurance (through CWS’s wholly owned insurance
subsidiary) as well as other expenditure associated with housing and equipment.
  The CWS's ambitions in financial services were then reflected in the application by the
CWS Bank for membership of the Committee of London Clearing Banks
75. The application
was refused on grounds not publicly disclosed but the CWS Bank was formally admitted in
1975.
For the CPBS the offer to collaborate provided unique access to the Co-operative
Movement with its ten million strong community of producers and consumers
76. In return,
the CPBS expected to generate (an undisclosed) potential of business referrals for the CWS
and Scottish CWS
77. However, the real attractiveness of this potential market depended on
the ability to take advantage of the special relationship.
At the time, both the English and Scottish Wholesale societies had accumulated
reserves (generated by term-deposits of retail societies) of £18.5m and £105m respectively.
Simultaneously and as part of a proposed plan for amalgamation between the Wholesale
societies, both had drafted (independently of each other) a five year plan. Both plans
coincided in identifying a need to finance private housing during the post-war period
78. The
Wholesale societies were also keen to grow into geographical areas or markets (such as
travel, motor trade, funeral furnishing, hire purchase of dry goods and the production and
distribution of shoes) not yet serviced by individual co-operative societies and housing
offered potential synergies with existing businesses. At the same time, the CWS Bank had21
offered mortgage loans to local authorities as early as 1931
79, and as a result CWS’
managers were well aware that in housing they needed to give:
‘special consideration to the probable powers to be given to local authorities and the
probable control of future activities [by] building societies’
80.
For the CWS and Scottish CWS, the CPBS deal also offered an alternative to setting
up a separate ‘Society’ exclusively dedicated to dealing with house purchase. Their decision
was clearly influenced by the attractiveness of CPBS’s offer as well as by repeated
interaction, within the canvas of the Co-operative Movement, of the directors as individuals
rather than as officers of the three organisations.
The deal was formalised when, as a result of the official meetings, the CPBS modified
its rules in 1944. For the first time in its history, CPBS appointed three representatives of the
CWS and one of the Scottish CWS onto its management board
81. The CWS then advanced
£100,000 sterling on term deposit to the CPBS, while directors of the latter sets aside up to
five million sterling for mortgage lending to support the development of housing societies
82.
The CPBS also nominated a sub-committee of directors, initially called ‘Housing
Development’ and later renamed ‘Co-operative Liaison’. This was a forum where
representatives of the CPBS, CWS and Scottish CWS could exchange ideas and submit
suggestions to each Board about the nature of plans to move forward with the provision of
housing throughout the UK.
Surprisingly the CWS was against the alliance with the CPBS to create a dedicated
organisation for centralised purchasing of furniture, household equipment, maintenance,
repair and decoration services
83. Perhaps this was a response to Scottish co-operators and
the powerful London Society rejecting the proposed amalgamation of the Wholesale
societies. Another influence of limited interaction between committees and financial
transactions seems to have been changing the procurement role of the CWS from being a
‘seller to’ to a ‘buyer for’ retail societies until 1965
84. In any event, lurking at the back of the
relation between the hundreds of individual societies and the two Wholesalers was a fear
that the interest of the latter might take power from the retailers.
The CWS rejection did not stop the CPBS from dedicating financial and organisational
resources to the alliance. For instance, the Chairman and the President of CPBS sought and22
found (outside of the building society) a suitable individual that would ‘… establish a more
effective liaison with the Co-operative Movement’
85. Between 1944 and 1952, the CPBS
sponsored a number of surveys on the housing market by the ‘Co-operative Liaison
Person’, results which were always shared with the CWS and Scottish CWS.
As mentioned, the success of collaboration between the CPBS and the Wholesale
societies relied on capitalising on the loyalty in each party’s members to capture a group of
customers with great potential for cross-selling opportunities. Both institutions believed that
they had huge potential for customer retention (i.e. loyalty). As summarised in Table 3, this
belief was based on the co-operative dividend cash payment (1845-1968) and the effects of
the interest rate system on the mortgage market (1939-84).





Mortgage Interest Rate Cartel
(1939-84)
Source Membership scheme where
customers participated in the
retailer’s financial margin.
Entry barrier into mortgage market.
Aim Implement a core principle  (i.e. the
first consumer oriented
organisation).
Protecting societies from the
consequences of extreme
competition given excess supply of
long-term funds and low interest
rates.
Management •  ‘Pass book’ (1845-1967)
•  Trading stamps (1968-77)
•  Plastic (1997-date)
Recommended rates through the
Building Societies Association
(1939).
Rewards Participants could benefit from low
prices, access facilities financed by
past generations of ‘co-operators’,
and receive quarterly dividend
payments.
Patronage of a single institution by
savers resulted in priority for the
allocation of mortgage funds.
Loss of
effectiveness
Inflation and cost of managing the
paper-based system. New
technology allows resurrecting the
‘divi’  but only 10 years after other
major retailers had successfully
introduced loyalty cards and
schemes.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer
threatened to review the cartel in the
light of the Restrictive Trades
Practices Act.
Sources: W. Richardson, The CWS in War and Peace 1938-1976 (Manchester, 1977), p. 339; G. Davies,
Building Societies and their Branches (London, 1981), p. 76; T.J. Gough, The Building Society Industry23
in Transition (London, 1982), p. 23; M. Boléat, The Building Society Industry (2
nd ed. 1986), p.175; J.
Birchall, Co-op: The People's Business (Manchester, 1994), p. 150; author.
First, the ‘co-op divi’ was a membership scheme where customers participated of the
retailer’s financial margin, for the ‘divi’ returned to all final consumers the profit on the prices
paid by all in proportion to their patronage
86. The ‘divi’ was replaced in 1968 with trading
stamps because of inflation, trading difficulties for societies (more below), as well as an
effort to co-ordinate the activities of co-operative retailers at national level. New technology,
however, eliminated the transaction cost and the CWS was then forced to resurrect the
‘divi’ in 1997 (10 years after other major retailers had successfully introduced loyalty cards
and schemes).
Secondly, the mortgage interest rate cartel was a system under which building societies
gave priority to deposit customers for the restricted supply of mortgages. In essence this
system was an effective entry barrier to the mortgage market. The mortgage rate cartel was
a form of forced customer loyalty that performed well during the 1950s and 1960s.
However during the 1970s the combination of the operation of the cartel, inflation and low
savings rates resulted in unsatisfied demand for mortgage funds, amounting to an estimated
£1,500m sterling or three per cent of the outstanding mortgage stock in 1979
87. The cartel
ended in 1984 after the Chancellor of the Exchequer threatened intervention.
In the light of the recommended rate system and the proven success of the ‘co-op divi’,
the CPBS and the CWS assumed that a strategic alliance could grow to mutual benefit. A
considerable expansion was expected in the housing market as well as the pre-eminence of
the Co-operative Movement in food retailing. Therefore, the agreement had the potential to
develop into a retailing conglomerate without competitive peer and to effectively contest
retail financial markets. Table 4 summarises the attempts, initiated primarily by CPBS, with a
view to taking collaboration beyond the interlocking of organisations at Board level.
The agreement immediately lifted the profile of the CPBS within the Co-operative
Movement. Preference was given by the CPBS to co-operative societies and their individual
members in the recruitment of agency contracts (which developed side by side with organic
growth of the CPBS’s branch network.) Early success in collaboration also resulted in
CPBS attracting term deposits from co-operative retail societies. The initial target of half a24
million sterling was met almost immediately, doubled by the end of 1946 and by 1947
investments of co-operative societies reached two million sterling. These investments were
set to continue growing had it not been that, at the insistence of the CWS Bank, the
campaign to attract funds from Co-op societies stopped in 1948 (later to have a moderate
re-start while avoiding encouraging transfers out of the CWS Bank). At the time, the CPBS
reached £50m in the sum of total assets.
Table 4: Implementation of the CWS-CPBS Alliance, 1944-1949
Year Action
1944 •  CPBS allocates £3m to support housing societies (increased to £5m).
•  CWS agrees to explore with CPBS ways to finance housing societies (including
hire purchase of furniture).
1945 •  First Housing Advisor and Co-operative Liaison Person appointed by CPBS.
•  CWS rejects centralised purchasing or establishing a dedicated organisation.
•  Joint advertising of alliance aiming to promote housing societies through printed
media, posters at retail societies and at the Co-operative Congress.
•  CPBS and CIS explore joint funding of endowment mortgages.
1946 •  Attempt to transfer all existing house insurance to be underwritten by the CIS.
•  Terms of co-operation between CPBS and CIS are revised.
•  First co-ordinated action of CPBS with CIS and CWS Bank to fix interest rates.
•  CPBS starts campaign to actively attract deposits from retail societies.
•  CPBS to open branch within the premise of a Preston retail society.
•  CIS and CPBS to explore making advances in Channel Islands and Isle of Man.
1947 •  Scottish CWS Bank begins trading.
•  Second Housing Advisor and Co-operative Liaison Person appointed by CPBS.
•  Agreement for CWS Bank and CPBS to jointly occupy space at retail societies.
•  CPBS advances of up to 100 per cent of mortgage value for individual purchase to
members of co-op societies (subject to guarantee of the retail society).
•  CWS Bank deposits £2m for two years at CPBS.
•  Joint action to attract funds of limited companies.
1948 •  Co-op societies are given preferential treatment to tender for work at or
construction of CPBS’s premises.
•  CIS formally named preferred issuer of house insurance by CPBS.
•  CWS Bank intervenes to stop campaign by CPBS to attract co-op societies’ funds.
•  CWS and Scottish CWS inform members and co-op societies of  CPBS’s
preferential status and request attempts to solicit funds from other building
societies are firmly rejected.
•  The Co-operative Union requests consideration to appoint one of its directors (in
addition to those of the CWS and Scottish CWS) to the Board of the CPBS. This
was turned down on constitutional grounds.
•  CIS agrees CPBS is free to pursue endowment mortgages with other providers (but
under the same conditions as those agreed with CIS).
1949 •  Building Societies Association recommends CPBS discontinues advertising for
funds of limited companies.25
•  First attempt ever by CPBS to calculate the average and incremental cost paid to
share deposits.
•  Co-op societies request direct representation in the CPBS Board (which the latter
rejected on constitutional grounds).
•  CWS directors inform Scottish CWS Bank and CPBS that instead of joint
advertising each should conduct its own campaign in its particular field/area.
Source: Minutes of the Board of Directors, Co-operative Permanent Building Society and Minutes of
the Board of Directors, Co-operative Wholesale Society.
By the end of the decade and under the auspices of the ‘Co-operative Liaison’
committee, there had been at least one annual meeting of representatives of the CPBS,
CWS, Scottish CWS, CWS Bank and CIS. Attendance of CWS and Scottish CWS to the
Board meetings of the CPBS had been mixed. Each meeting sought new ways to increase
the membership of the financial services offered by these social providers, as well as
investment accounts and term deposits at CPBS, CWS Bank and CIS.
However, the introduction of the Rent Restriction Act was putting in jeopardy future
plans regarding housing associations, which was the backbone of the initial agreement, while
the 1949 devaluation of the pound threatened the liquidity of the CPBS. Emergency
measures then followed, including a plea for the CWS Bank to extend the maturity of its two
million sterling term deposit.
In short, collaboration is likely to be observed between a set of persons and
organisations who share a common history and are linked by a set of social relations of a
specified type such as friendship, transfer of funds and overlapping membership. Underlying
embeddedness facilitates trust building. Embeddedness would suggest that participants who
are strongly tied to each other are likely to develop understanding of the utility of certain
behaviour as a result of discussing alternatives in strong, socialising relations, which in turn
influence their actions
88. However, the likelihood that partners perceive growth opportunities
with the same intensity is questionable. As a result, one partner can benefit from the
agreement and further develop capabilities to compete while the other remains stagnant.
VI
In post-war Britain the main housing policies of the 1945 Labour government under
Aneurin Bevan, Clement Attlee's Housing Minister, were to replace private landlords with
private and municipal housing. The change of government in 1951 and the new emphasis on26
private housing produced a period of rapid growth for building societies. Between 1952 and
1979 the number of building society branches grew from 1,455 to 5,434 with the number of
societies consolidating from 796 to 287. The five biggest societies expanded branches at
double the sector’s rate, with CPBS retaining its fifth place with 20 per cent of total
branches
89. For CPBS, the 100 branch mark was broken by the mid-1950s, the £100m in
assets mark in 1954, while that same year the agency system extended to some 2,500
points of contact for the general public
90.
There was a turning point for building society growth in 1959 when the Exchequer
introduced a minimum reserve level of two per cent of the sum of total assets. As they were
unable to fulfil the requirement, most building societies halted their expansionary policy. The
CPBS disposed of more than 1,000 agents (which more liquid competitors were eager to
capture), imposed a £500 sterling ceiling on new advances, and even sold and leased back
its head office to the CIS. The self-imposed period of restraint ended in 1964, with the
CPBS's reserve ratio rising to well over three per cent.
For the CPBS the period of self-restraint to meet capital requirements resulted in a
major review of strategy. It found that half of the 1,159 agencies in existence in 1963
produced deposits each amounting to less than £2,000 sterling. The response was to
replace those agents with CPBS employees and move to a branch structure whenever
possible
91. By 1966 it was also evident that the transaction flow between CPBS and the
CWS had not materialised nor had the CWS ever fulfilled the earlier promise of transferring
deposits worth as much as £100m sterling to the CPBS
92. Rationing, price controls and
international shortages during the post-war years reduced trading margins and curtailed
special price discount possibilities for co-operative wholesalers.
Table 5 summarises how by 1952 evidence had started to emerge that the Co-
operative Movement and the CWS were failing to realise the potential of the post-war
economic expansion
93. Change depicted in Table 5 associates with environmental turbulence
as well as internal change within the partners. Relevant aspects of internal innovations include
the introduction of a new organisational structure at CPBS which followed the 1950
appointment to the newly created job of Chief Executive Officer (eliminating the Managing
Director post). This was the second time the CPBS made an external appointment to its
Board when considering CWS and Scottish CWS representatives, but the first time that a27
CPBS director had been promoted from outside the CPBS and the Co-operative
Movement.
By 1965 the last formal element in the coalition disappeared as the CPBS ceased
further appointments of directors from the CWS and Scottish CWS
94. CPBS’s internal
estimates at the time reckoned that agencies within the Co-operative Movement failed to
generate mortgage referrals while co-operative societies (including CWS wholly owned
subsidiaries) consistently withdrew term deposits
95. Hence, the fund surpluses that had
previously existed were absorbed within the Co-operative Movement. At the same time,
meetings of the ‘Co-operative Liaison Committee’ and the ‘Co-operative Liaison Person’
who was an external consultant, frustrated the CPBS Board as they continued failing to
report tangible results.
Table 5: Implementation of the CWS-CPBS Alliance, 1950-1952
Year Action
1950 •  Herbert Ashworth – He moved from the Portman Building Society to the newly
created post of Chief Executive for CPBS.
•  New CEO assesses whether the agency appointments of co-operative societies or
their officials (in their individual capacity) had developed appreciable flow of
business. In geographies and areas where that was not the case, the CPBS
appointed a second agent.
•  CPBS speeds up organic growth of retail branch network.
•  CIS refuses to grant preferential commission charges to CPBS.
•  CPBS unwilling to collect monthly insurance premiums for CIS.
•  Third Housing Advisor appointed by CPBS (but with no responsibilities for
liasing with Co-operative Movement).
•  CIS refuses to explore any other major investment in housing associations with
CPBS.
•  Diversification of treasury operations at CPBS starts with the progressive
liquidation of National War Bond holdings to invest in gilt-edge securities.
•  Co-ordination of interest rate fixing between CPBS and CWS’s subsidiaries stops.
•  CPBS introduces plan to reach £70m total assets by the end of 1951.
1951 •  CPBS sets up Cardiff branch in the same premises as the CWS shop.
•  CPBS enforces policy closing agency relations with low transaction flow co-
operative societies.
•  Auctioneers, estate agents, accountants and surveyors to be appointed agents of
CPBS.
1952 •  Co-operative Union proposes to CWS, Scottish CWS and CPBS the creation of a
single co-operative finance front (called Co-operative Finance Corporation).
CPBS’s directors turn down the idea on grounds that independence would be
compromised but CPBS is ‘glad to contribute with advice and assistance on
mortgage finance’.
•  Appointed of Housing Advisor terminated before contract expired.28
•  Repayment of £2m term deposit to CWS Bank by CPBS.
•  Repayment of £1m term deposit to CIS by CPBS deferred to 1953.
•  Introduction of regional boards to manage CPBS’s retail branch networks.
•  Co-operative Liaison Person (sponsored by CPBS) reports to the ‘Co-operative
Liaison Committee’ on the location of industry, demand of supply of houses and
relative matters. No action follows.
Source: Minutes of the Board of Directors, Co-operative Permanent Building Society and Minutes of
the Board of Directors, Co-operative Wholesale Society.
A final and devastating break between both organisations took place because of
continued erosion of the Co-operative Movement’s competitive position. From 1957 sales
declined by three to five per cent annually for both wholesale and retail societies
96, and by
1965 the Co-operative Congress recognised reorganisation was inevitable. The weaker
retail societies collapsed and were absorbed by the CWS through the Co-operative
Retailing Society (CRS).
  Trading and liquidity problems at the Co-operative Movement attracted the attention of
the press. In particular, television coverage suggested that the CPBS was at risk, which
stimulated withdrawals. At the same time, market research showed that only 20 per cent of
CPBS members were co-operators and that only a few of the 200 or so co-operative
societies acting as agents in 1967 produced significant deposits
97. A merger with a small
London-based society called the British Co-operative Building Society (which had nothing
to do with the Co-operative Movement), gave CPBS's management the opportunity to
distance itself from the Co-operative Movement and change its name to the Nationwide
Building Society. The change of name took place in 1970 and with it ended the potential for
the Co-operative Movement to develop the first truly universal bank, that is, a strategy that
at that time would have overtaken even the most visionary commercial banks.
There are several potential reasons to explain the demise of the CPBS-CWS deal. A
primary reason for the failure of collaboration between the CWS and CPBS was the demise
of the CWS’s competitive position, from a strong partner to a weak counterpart (and by
1970 even considered a liability). Secondly, the higher profitability of CPBS's directly
controlled branch business compared with their CWS-based agency business demonstrated
limited synergy. A third element was that potential synergies available from pooling capital
were precluded by legislation so the overall cost of capital remained unchanged. As a result,29
the financial flows were minimal. In 1970, Herbert Ashworth, then the Chairman of the
CPBS, said that:
‘In the past 20 years the amount of money invested in the society by Co-operative
organisation had shrunk from £16m to £893,000 sterling.’
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This was a long way from the of the end-of-War commitment of £100m sterling.
Another explanation for the lack of cohesion between CWS and CPBS refers to the
organisational structure of the collaborating agreement. Each member of the CPBS-CWS
deal remained independent, followed its own strategy and rejected consideration of greater
integration of strategic or operational matters. Lower profitability and the high costs of
administrating the dividend saw the Co-operative Movement abandon its loyalty scheme.
Meanwhile the CPBS was able to use the mortgage cartel and its national branch network
to increase its loyal customer base. The relative success of the CPBS meant that the CWS’s
role as a preferred organisation failed to develop.
In brief, power positions within the alliance shifted as a result of environmental change,
legislative and regulatory innovations and a failure to preserve initial capabilities. This
indicates that to support success in retail finance, alliances need mechanisms to ensure the
development of required capabilities, resources and skills. In the case of the CWS-CPBS
alliance collaboration took place exclusively at Board level (i.e. interlocking directorates)
and the agreement failed to implement cross-selling opportunities. Together these factors
limited the potential to unite two strong customer retention schemes.
VII
In sharp contrast to the horizontal CWS-CPBS alliances designed to achieve product
diversification, Spanish ‘cajas’ (i.e. savings banks) developed a vertical alliance structured
through a ‘central’ savings bank or wholesaler of retail finance. This kind of institution dated
to the early 20
th century and was pioneered by Skopbank in Finland (established in 1908),
Fellesbanken in Norway and ICCRI in Italy (both established in 1919). ‘Central’ banks
were membership owned and they had little influence on members’ strategic or operational
matters. Their aim was to service the needs of participating institutions often in a
representative capacity but also in areas where necessary economies of scale were beyond30
the individual member
99. In Spain, the ‘central’ or main clearing bank for savings banks was
called the Instituto de Crédito de las Cajas de Ahorro (ICCA).
The ICCA was created in 1933 to act as a clearing bank for Spanish savings banks.
The aim of the new intermediary was to enable pooling of financial resources in order to
fund or syndicate social-charter investments as well as establishing a ‘lender of last resort’
scheme for the cajas. In 1962, ICCA became the savings banks’ formal representative at
the Ministry of Finance and turned into the prime instrument for government control over the
cajas. ICCA formally disappeared in 1971, its control and supervision duties were
absorbed by the Bank of Spain and its clearing functions by the Confederación Española de
Cajas de Ahorro (CECA)
100.
The Spanish Confederation of Savings Banks (CECA) was established in 1927 as the
independent federations of cajas amalgamated. Bank federations in Spain emerged as a
response to regulatory changes that modified the otherwise equal framework for business
under which commercial and savings banks could compete
101. CECA extended the cajas’
domestic and international influence and the ability to lobby on their behalf.
Besides its attempts to counter balance the commercial banks' cartel (Consejo Superior
Bancario, 1921-94), CECA was used by the Spanish government to co-ordinate social
charter investment. In 1939, CECA also helped to implement a ‘principle of territoriality’,
through which savings banks' business was restricted to a single province
102.
As in the US state banking regime, restrictions to geographic growth limited potential
economies of scale at Spanish savings banks. The disadvantage was critical for two reasons.
First, it limited opportunities for market diversification as a nationwide market for goods and
products that emerged in Spain at the end of the Franco regime. Secondly, limited
geographic growth restricted consolidation which would have been required to benefit from
technical change (IT investments in particular). As described by one interviewee:
‘Several of our lines [of business] are nurtured by or are left in the hands of the
Confederation. Perhaps the most strategic aspects [of developing semi-related
business lines] are left to the Confederation. There are different committees or
working groups to request the development of a new line [of business]. There is one
called COA and it is the one in charge of overseeing all opportunities for joint
business. They undertake studies and see whether it is more interesting for the
smaller banks or for CECA to provide, say, telephone banking services. This study31
is then the subject of consideration by all the cajas and those who want to develop
that facility together will then join with CECA. Others will wish to develop
organically and assume the risks involved. As a result, we have no studies [looking
at our organisation individually] to enter into a new line of business. But you will find
many studies exploring new opportunities for the whole of the Confederation and
they include total clients, total expected response, cost levels, etc. Decisions are
based on that information. Therefore, small and medium sized cajas leave that kind
of project to CECA. Another very innovative project is the introduction of the
electronic purse and that too is being developed by the Confederation, once again
reflecting how we leave certain strategic aspects to CECA. We thus leave any
major investment to CECA. We, in turn, avoid ascertaining discount factors. Rather
our project appraisal entails assessing the incremental costs for the [retail] branch
network and then [using short term government debt as discount factor to] forecast
three years of profit and loss statements for our caja.’
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The long period of geographic restrictions left Spanish savings banks with outsourcing
as the only option to access scale benefits not attainable individually. As a result,
collaboration characterised by the organisational structure of a strong and successful alliance
emerges throughout the history of CECA. This collectively owned central operator became
the main recipient of the cajas’ outsourcing strategies and clearing activities.
CECA, therefore, went beyond creating scale and capabilities in IT or clearing activities
and began to develop and supply financial services to retail members. These services
included currency dealing, leasing, credit card management (branded ‘Tarjeta 6000’) and
factoring. CECA also represented savings banks in the international credit card clearing of
VISA and MasterCard through the Eufiserv network. Wholesale international transactions
on behalf of the cajas began in 1988. These services developed into representative offices in
major international financial centres, a single point for SWIFT exchanges, 1,300
correspondent agreements with banks in 88 countries and trading operations whereby
CECA became the third biggest Spanish player in spot currency transactions
104. Services
from CECA also included non-financial services like research, executive education, auditing
inter-bank agreements, centralised marketing and purchasing.
In 1975 the Spanish savings banks developed electronic clearing with CECA acting as
the central point for inter-bank payment settlements amongst the savings banks, as well as
for the co-ordinator for the ATM and EFPTOS networks. To achieve cost savings, a
standard was established for the cajas' IT platform and a single interface with the Spanish
clearing house system. Data processing at CECA linked 50 independent centres at savings32
banks and acted as a back-up centre for many more institutions
105. In the mid-1990s, IT
services developed to include Web information services (an intranet with links to Internet),
mobile offices and telephone banking for small savings banks.
From 1975 to 1985 the ‘big’ cajas actively engaged in CECA's activities as there were
no major operational or strategy distinctions between them and the ‘small’ cajas
106. The
association of ‘big’ cajas continued while all the cajas could benefit from the troubles of the
commercial bank sector, which resulted in the growth of advantages and profits for the
cajas
107. However, reduced rates of market penetration increasingly turned CECA into the
defender of the smaller savings banks and this was accentuated as bigger cajas pursued
distinctive diversification moves such as their own international departments or the purchase
of failed co-operative banks (circa 1987). The ominous trend for CECA changed in the
mid-1990s and was associated with the cajas having to update IT investments, a new
general manager being named for CECA (Juan R. Quintás, a former management
consultant), and renewed importance for CECA as the ‘central’ Spanish savings bank.
In brief, competitive collaboration between Spanish cajas led to the development of
CECA in 1927. CECA then encompassed a group of financial intermediaries that for a very
long period of time had their business potential and diversification opportunities (in bank
markets) limited by regulation. However, economic growth in Spain during the 1980s and
early 1990s, domestic regulatory change and the adoption of IT applications allowed these
mutual financial intermediaries to achieve successful diversification in Spanish bank markets.
Some of these opportunities for growth were opened by managers of individual savings
banks while others were only achievable through co-operation within CECA. Tactical
strategies of savings banks thus resulted in high sustainability of competitive advantage for
the whole co-operation agreement.
VIII
At the end of the 1980s all CECA members remained legally and functionally
independent and, contrary to other European experiences, the alliance had not grown into a
single franchise
108. Although each savings bank had an independent treasury department, the
risk-diversification of the system meant that as a group, the cajas’ cost of funds was as much
as one per cent below that of private banks
109. This advantage continued throughout the33
1980s and emerged during a period (circa 1962 to 1977) in which the cajas’ collaborative
strategies evolved to reduce their competitive disadvantage relative to full-service banks
110.
Another source of advantage emerged around the restrictions on product and market
diversification. These restrictions resulted in a focus of the business of the savings banks on
servicing private individuals and small and medium sized firms. The savings banks thus
obtained a dominant market position amongst lower-income customers but also in the
Spanish middle class. The retail focus thus engendered a strong competitive base in the late
1970s as the cajas gained greater operative freedom. Moreover, the period of growth
coincided with a crisis amongst their main competitors, the commercial banks, from 1977 to
1985.
The cost-sharing network of CECA worked well, simplified achieving control at the
caja level, and provided savings banks with a low cost-base that helped them deal with the
long economic downturn associated with the energy crises and the end of Franco’s
regime
111. Strong regional ties and effective use of IT also helped Spanish savings banks to
increase their share of deposits (which in any event was being eroded at the top end by
growing bank disintermediation). During this period, savings banks’ share of deposits grew
from 30 per cent in 1966 to 35.3 per cent in 1980 and to 42 per cent in 1988
112.
This growth was mainly at the expense of commercial banks who had enjoyed an
unusually large portion of total national assets by international standards. Indeed, in 1989
Spanish commercial banks held 73 per cent of total liquid assets while this ratio averaged
between 24 and 50 per cent in other European countries
113. However, much of the Spanish
growth had been fuelled by investments in large multinationals who required investments and
international banking services which were not the strengths of the Spanish commercial
banks. Also these newcomers tended to acquire or displace indigenous Spanish companies
further eroding the customer base of the Spanish commercial banks.
Changes in the ability to compete forced commercial banks to redirect their attention to
retail customers and thus to start to pay interest on current accounts. Their aim was to
increase their share of deposits but also reduce the savings banks’ share of retail banking.
The move was initiated in October 1989 but this effort effectively broke the Spanish banking
cartel and was followed by a mortgage rate war. Despite the actions of commercial banks,
the alliance structure of the cajas remained intact and savings banks continued growing and34
even gained market share
114. By 1994 savings banks captured 47 per cent of total liabilities
for the overall Spanish banking system (51 per cent of total deposits made by individuals).
In other words, in 1994 the cajas achieved a market share that for the first time in their
collective history exceeded the market share of commercial banks
115.
The relative success of savings banks in securing leadership of Spanish retail finance in
spite of commercial banks’ efforts to the contrary, gives an insight into the sources of the
cajas' competitive advantage. Anecdotal evidence suggested that the cajas’ competitive
advantage was built upon market specialisation as their shared strategy seemed to work
despite wide variations in cajas’ sizes
116. Once savings- and commercial banks operated
under the same regulatory framework (from 1985) and increasingly began to compete for
the same sources of income
117, the lower cost base of decentralised simplicity and
centralised complexity became clearer. However, econometric analysis suggested that
market focus and specialisation did not solely account for superior performance
118. This
research established that equivalent size commercial- and savings banks had distinct
differences in their commercial and financial capabilities. In effect, distinctive management
practices resulted in cost differences beyond what was explained by market
specialisation
119.  In other words, some cajas enjoyed additional operational efficiencies to
the benefits attributed to the CECA alliance.
One of the key elements in savings banks’ competitive advantage between 1985 and
1990 was IT
120. CECA led IT development and this allowed the cajas to benefit from their
national coverage. CECA introduced a nationwide electronic interbank funds transfer
system, direct salary payments, and a state-of-the-art ATM network. These were computer
systems designed to provide interoperability rather than exclusivity or competitive
advantage.
Accelerated growth and wider responsibilities created operational and strategic
problems for CECA
121. CECA originated to service the entire caja system but voting
procedures meant it was dominated by the small cajas. In an effort to retain the business of
regional and big savings banks, CECA had to devise new ways to share the synergy benefits
more favourably with the large cajas (whose business was necessary to create them).
CECA therefore set up limited cross-subsidisation between membership fees and supplied
services
122.35
The efforts made towards financial soundness and fair pricing policies also addressed
the need to make substantial IT investments to keep up with developments at commercial
banks
123. At the time, major cajas were investing in proprietary systems and medium sized
institutions were actively outsourcing outside the CECA umbrella by transferring
management of legacy hardware, IT systems and risk-control software to international
vendors like Unisys, EDS, Microsoft, ICL, Bull or IBM
124.  Furthermore, three member
savings banks of non-neighbouring regions created a joint venture (called ATC) that by-
passed actual and potential services from CECA. Between 1990 and 1994, this consortium
integrated their electronic banking systems in a joint venture
125. Consortium members agreed
to respect existing geographical boundaries but co-operated to provide joint capabilities to
reduce costs, improve overall skills, and customer databases
126.
Growth in such ‘non-obligational’ outsourcing agreements and creation of saving bank
consortia reflected the limits to which smaller cajas could disproportionately enjoy the
benefits of CECA. The result was that CECA concentrated on services required for small
savings banks to achieve critical scale in several IT dimensions and thus increasingly
provided the basis for competitive advantage.
For instance, in 1994 negotiations between CECA and the two top cajas to improve
back-office systems and develop key products like electronic purses reached a critical
point
127. Through the resulting agreement CECA members and major banks established the
standard for the electronic purse
128. The competing standard (Visa Cash) was then forced to
review its strategy and accept interoperability in order to maintain its market position
129.
In brief, services provided by CECA became a necessary (but not sufficient) condition
for individual market success. CECA's services provided the cajas with the necessary
flexibility to anticipate a competitive advantage but it was up to the individual caja
management teams to identify the most promising growth opportunities.
IX
The stance adopted throughout this article to assess the success of collaboration
agreements prefers to judge partnerships through changes in competitive strength as
measured by the development and renewal of capabilities, rather than the transaction’s
longevity or the formality and visible structure of agreements. This viewpoint sees alliances36
as essential tactical elements and is the one taken to illustrate the evolution of two integration
episodes in retail banking. Through collaboration strategies and outsourcing, alliance
members achieve capabilities that as a group allowed them to challenge banks in the
provision of retail finance. As independent companies the absolute investment and
information barriers would have made risks of entry far more of a deterrent. The discussion
reviews bank capabilities in terms of their advantage relative to complex (alliance)
competition as well as relative to direct competition while focus on risk management skills
emerges as one of the key areas mitigating competitiveness.
The discussion suggests that the CWS-CPBS alliance was a private attempt to access
the benefits of risk diversification and exchange of customer access while Spanish savings
banks built around sharing a cluster that was sensitive to scale and technology. Regulation
was a critical element in shaping the structure of the market and the strategic opportunities of
both players. The CWS-CPBS deal makes its appearance in an environment characterised
by both banks and building societies defining their stance though a market imperfection
(namely, monopoly of the clearing system and supply of residential mortgages). Competitive
collaboration aimed to bypass these restrictions by increasing the portfolio diversification of
the CWS while the CPBS increased its share of the mortgage market. CECA also began to
strengthen individual savings banks in the light of the Spanish banking cartel. A change in
regulation enabled CECA to contest the market for clearing activities in favour of the cajas.
This, together with IT investments co-ordinated by CECA, allowed the savings banks to
build a base that evolved into a competitive advantage.
Evidence in this study highlights the importance of social embeddedness to explain the
formation and development of competitive co-operation. For instance, links developing from
personal and organisational relationships place CPBS as the favourite building society for the
Co-operative Movement. The deal with CWS and the Scottish CWS then sought to
capitalise on friendship, trust, and overlapping membership to intensify the transfer of funds,
referral business and access to markets that regulation otherwise kept out of reach. In the
same vein, CECA was the forum through which managers of the Spanish cajas often filtered
growth opportunities and CECA also allowed smaller cajas to achieve critical scale in IT-
intensive markets. However, it was the individual actions of the cajas’ managers that37
changed competitive intensity as CECA was unable to implement change without the
support of its members.
As opposed to the opaque boundaries and expectations in the CPBS-CWS alliance,
exchanges through CECA entailed relatively well defined expectations of  behaviour by
participants toward other actors (both at the individual and organisational levels).
Participants then shared connections in order to gather common information and knowledge
of each other, of each others’ cajas and of local markets. As a result, it is clear interaction
through social networks and working collaboration which predisposes participants to select
partners. For instance, two geographically distant cajas are more likely to engage in
collaboration between themselves than individually with a commercial bank or a non-
financial provider. For the same reason, previously unconnected firms within the Co-
operative Movement were more likely to enter into collaboration. The CPBS and the CIS
had been in business relations at the turn of the 20
th century, placing them less distant from
each other and more likely to engage in a competitive collaboration network than with each
others’ peers in the building society or insurance market, respectively.
Evidence in the research also suggests there were systematic differences in the
capabilities to manage co-operation. The CPBS successfully replaced the low transaction
volume agency contracts with co-operative societies (or their officials acting in individual
capacity) with more intensive referrals for mortgage business from agents who were closer
to the overall process (such as accountants, real estate agents and lawyers). The results
regarding the relative importance of capabilities to manage alliances are thus surprising given
that both the CWS and the Scottish CWS had a long experience of collaboration with
individual members, long standing suppliers, and dealing with co-operative societies. These
research results would thus raise questions as to the importance of identifying differences
between capabilities to manage seemingly related agreements and capabilities to manage a
portfolio of different type of alliances.
As with other episodes of collaboration documented in the literature, research in this
article pays attention to the dynamics relating interlocked directorates and alliance
performance. For instance, control of the CWS-CPBS deal developed through interaction
at a single point of activity and while exchanging information exclusively at the highest levels
of management. On the other hand, CECA delivered several types of services and38
effectively acted as a forum for the  cajas’ top and middle managers. The continuous
interaction at CECA allowed the exchange of market information, identification of
competitive concerns of mutual interest (such as new entrants, technological changes or
development of new skills), and mutual understanding of partners' broad capabilities. All
these features allowed the Spanish alliance to re-negotiate more often than the British
alliance.
The analysis of the CWS-CPBS agreement, however, must also recognise that the UK
episode illustrates more vision in re-engineering the business to avoid entry barriers. The
CWS-CPBS alliance unified participants’ competitive tactics and goals with the target of
developing a pre-eminent position in UK retail finance. In this respect, there was little
strategic intent in the Spanish alliance. Spanish savings banks gained force in a change of
regulation that allowed them to extract competitive advantage over a wide range of business
but as a group the savings banks lacked a unifying purpose or strategic vision. The cajas
were unwilling or unable to strengthen other sources of growth outside their goal of achieving
critical scale in selected markets through CECA. Therefore, as a group the Spanish alliance
benefited more from emergent strategies (such as changes in regulation) than from visionary
actions.
These research results thus support the idea
130 that shared comprehension of growth
opportunities (and the consequences of changes in expected pay-offs emerging from
environmental turbulence) is critical to understand alliance formation and development.
Shared comprehension also helps to understand the incentives to co-operate, identify
mechanisms to align otherwise incongruent expectation about collaboration, and assess the
possibilities for participants influencing alliance outcomes unilaterally.
Research in this article also supports the idea that organisations establish co-operation
for reasons other than symbolic social affirmation. Competitive co-operation moves forward
on concrete strategic complementarity that the participants have to offer each other.
Research in this article thus suggests that the strategic advantage from competitive
collaboration and outsourcing alliances in banking is possible if the resulting arrangement:
•  Allows participants effective access to pooled regulatory capital (to optimise capital
resources across certain activities);39
•  Delivers netting within asset-and-liability management systems (so it captures
financial economies of scale and creates liquidity);
•  Provides diversification and so improves credit rating; or
•  Provides critical economies of scale in managing common systems (such as
payments, interconnectivity or re-insurance functions).
In brief, the case study on strategic alliances suggests that developing adequate
capabilities to compete might be as important as identifying the best opportunities.40
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